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The following paper explores the foundations of phenomenology, and seeks to provide those new 
to the discipline with ways of understanding its claims to assist knowers to attend to 'the things 
themselves'. Practical applications of this mode of inquiry are linked to adult education practice 
which is the author's field of practice but most of the ideas are readily applicable to social events 




Phenomenological approaches have been chosen to 
underpin interpretative research approaches that 
attempt to find a way to represent lived-experience in 
as raw and un-elaborated a way as possible. The task 
of this paper is to explore a continued place for 
phenomenology’s claim to reach past various 
interpretations of reality to ‘the things themselves’ in 
the light of the view that human knowledge is 
language bound and that ‘the things themselves’ are 
of course not ‘things’ physically impressed upon the 
knower’s retina and mind but the result of an active 
process of classification and ‘naming’.   
The question then can be re-phrased as to what is 
phenomenology's form of naming that underpins and 
warrants its claim to be seeking ‘the things 
themselves’? The argument being made here is that 
what is meant by the phrase to seek for the ‘things 
themselves’ refers more to a particular stance of the 
researcher. It is not uncommon for researchers to seek 
validation of a hypothesis derived from a particular 
theoretical approach by doing fieldwork in search of 
evidence to substantiate it. This quest for what one 
has decided to look for can cloud the researcher’s 
gaze so that significant elements of the human activity 
that is being researched can be overlooked. The 
phenomenological stance seeks to approach events 
and activities with an investigative mind deliberately 
open, consciously trying to ‘bracket out’ assumptions 
and remain attentive to what is present.  It is this last 
point which suggests a significant dimension of social 
research highlighted by the broad phenomenological 
approach.  
Before human activities and events can be subjected 
to analytical abstracting knowledge, they are received 
as experiences. Not only do humans name reality in 
the light of categories already established in their 
mind by a Piagetian process of assimilation and 
accommodation but the reality that is named is not 
perceived in a detached purely ‘objective’ way almost 
as if the human mind was imagined as a camera. It is 
presented as an ‘experienced’ thing in which what is 
placed before the mind for naming, is, as it were, a 
result of a mixture of sensory experiences, emotional 
responses, memories, prejudices and the like.  
The following paper explores the roots of 
phenomenology and ways in which its claims to assist 
knowers to attend upon ‘the things themselves’ can be 
understood. Practical applications of this mode of 
inquiry are linked to adult education practice which is 
the author's field of practice but most of the ideas are 
readily applicable to social events and practices such 
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as nursing, social work, recreation, history and the 
like. 
Definitions 
Phenomenology is not so much a particular method as 
a particular approach which was adopted and 
subsequently modified by writers, beginning with 
Husserl, who wanted to reaffirm and describe their 
‘being in the world’ as an alternative way to human 
knowledge, rather than objectification of so-called 
positivist science. Paul Ricoeur (1978, p. 1214) 
referred to phenomenological research as “the 
descriptive study of the essential features of 
experience taken as a whole” and a little later, stated 
that it “has always been an investigation into the 
structures of experience which precede connected 
expression in language.” Valle and Halling (1989, p. 
6) described phenomenology as:  
… the rigorous and unbiased study of things 
as they appear so that one might come to an 
essential [fundamental] understanding of 
human consciousness and experience... 
Phenomenology does not hold that the world ‘out 
there’ can be known in the way a photographic plate 
takes in an image of the world. All knowing is at one 
level subjective since it is always related to, and 
constructed by, the person engaged in knowing. As 
Spiegelberg, a renowned central authority on the 
phenomenological movement, wrote (1959, p. 75): 
All phenomenology takes its start from the 
phenomena. A phenomenon is essentially 
what appears to someone, that is, to a subject.  
Some of this subjectivity focuses on the things being 
experienced, while some focuses on the person 
experiencing the thing. Spiegelberg (ibid. p. 78) lists a 
range of meanings of subjectivity in order to explore 
the nature of more-than-purely-subjective subjective 
knowledge which is generated in phenomenological 
approaches.  He writes: 
I conclude that all phenomenology as a study 
of the phenomena, is subjective in the sense 
that its objects are subject-related but not in 
the sense that it makes them completely 
subject-dependent.  
Research of this kind into adult education practice for 
example aims to make the phenomenon of adult 
education a meaningful named reality. Meaningful 
refers in the first place to the person who experienced 
it, but then through that person’s vivid portrayal - 
vivid it should be pointed out, initially to the eyes of 
the person experiencing it - to generate some echoes 
in others, particularly those with similar experiences. 
The goal here is the construction of such a discourse 
applied to adult education. 
Adult educators returning to their experience can ask 
themselves what the experience, for example teaching 
adults in a literacy class, was like as a lived- 
experience (identifying their objectivised subjective 
feelings). They can also ask how they felt while in 
such an experience (identifying their subjectivised 
subjective feelings). Answers to the first question 
would tell something of what teaching literacy is like 
in a way that would make it possible for others to 
imagine it could potentially be their experience. 
Answers to the second question tell more of what the 
person having the experience is like. This is the 
difference denoted between the two questions ‘What 
was it like?’ and ‘How did you feel?’ Both of these 
have a place in this study and are discussed at length 
below. 
The distinction between the orientation of two 
questions is based on the difference between what 
Crotty (1996a) has called ‘new’ phenomenology and 
'classical' phenomenology, and which are called 
‘empathetic’ and ‘intuiting’ forms in this paper. This 
has been developed in earlier writings (cf. Willis 
1999) and is explored below in the general 
background to phenomenology.  
Background 
Phenomenological research was originally developed 
by Husserl (1931, etc.), Heidegger (1962, etc.) and 
Merleau-Ponty (1962, etc.) and received elaboration 
by their great apologist, Spiegelburg (1975). It has 
become a major source of illumination for psychology 
(cf. Colaizzi 1973; Valle & Halling 1989) and nursing 
research (cf. Crotty, 1996a). It has also been applied 
with great effect to school education by van Manen 
(1977, 1990), and to adult education, as has been 
pointed out by Stanage (1987) and Collins (1984, 
1987) and to a lesser extent, Brookfield (1990a, b). 
Phenomenology wants to slow the researcher down 
and hold his or her gaze on the phenomenon itself - 
the lived-experience of some activity - seeking not to 
locate it in an abstract matrix by saying how its 
abstracted structure might be similar to others, but 
rather to illumine its specific quality as an experience. 
In its historical origins, phenomenology rose out of a 
reaction to positivism through which the discourses of 
the physical sciences were applied to all forms of 
human inquiry. Husserl (1964) and his followers 
created a counter move, attending to the part humans 
play in the actual construction of the world as it is 
experienced. There is a tension between objectifying 
views that posit that the world, as we know it, exists 
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‘out there’ independently of human consciousness; 
and mentalist views, that think the world is purely a 
construction of the mind. Phenomenology was to steer 
a middle path. 
The great quest of phenomenological researchers was 
thus to ‘go back to the things themselves’. But what 
are these ‘things’? What kind of objectivity is meant 
here? One of the crucial fundamental points of the 
phenomenological approach is that when we refer to 
‘things out there’, we are in fact providing a name to 
‘things’ constructed and named in the mind, without 
which they could not be thought. As Davis (1991, p. 
5) put it, summarizing the thought of Swingewood 
(1984):  
the meaning of things is not inherent in 
objects, but is actually located in the 
individual’s inner life... The researcher’s task 
is to understand reality as it is, actively and 
consciously created by subjects, not as a pure 
entity that exists ‘out there’.  
Having said this, it seems that ‘things’ are not simply 
things but rather become ‘things’ in the act of 
perception and naming.  This basic naming is always 
being further shaped and distorted by all kinds of 
cultural influences on the knowing subject. The 
phenomenological agenda is an attempt to get back to 
the first naming: “to understand and describe 
phenomena exactly as they appear in an individual’s 
consciousness” (Phillipson 1972). The leading idea is 
that humans need to be aware of the power of the 
human mind to distort basic ideas of reality according 
to culturally pre-set prejudices and ways of thinking. 
The phenomenological stance does not immediately 
attend to, or name, the source of distortion, but rather 
attempts to bypass it. This process referred to as 
‘epoché’ or ‘bracketing’ is discussed in detail below. 
It wants to bring the inquirer’s eye and mind back to 
the thing itself and ask: ‘What is it like?’ The 
‘phenomenological eye’ seeks to ‘bracket out’ later 
interpretative constructions and re-constructions. As 
Crotty (1996a, p. 38) puts it, “the focus should lie 
with what manifests itself in experience rather than 
what the subject has made of it.” 
A researcher in a particular field of human practice or 
endeavour (such as nursing, teaching, hairdressing, 
flying an aeroplane) pursuing this methodology, 
attempts to portray his or her lived-experience, 
focusing specifically on what gives the experience its 
unique nameable qualities as a particular phenomenon 
impinging on her or his experience. Phenomenology 
is not concerned with generating abstractions, 
concepts, hypotheses or theories, nor with identifying 
causes. The texts for this project need to avoid the 
pitfalls of scientism or objectivism (by creating a text 
in the style of a scientific report) on the one hand, and 
narcissism (by creating a self-preoccupied and self-
referencing text) on the other. They need to tread a 
fine line which somehow brings together the objective 
and subjective dimensions of the lived-experience. 
The textual genre of the research writing which 
presents the fruits of such inquiry needs to be able to 
convey some of the vividness of specific and heartfelt 
experience. It will need to be a text that, as Reason 
and Rowan (1981) suggest, retains some vitality; an 
approach “which is a systematic, rigorous search for 
truth, but does not kill off all it touches” (p. xiii).  
Foundations 
This section explores the meaning and significance of 
‘intentionality’, one of the pivotal notions of 
phenomenology. This is followed by a brief 
exploration of the knowing process, looking firstly at 
stances in knowing, then different forms of 
interpretation and finally questions of objectivity and 
subjectivity. 
Intentionality 
Husserl’s view was that all human thinking was, in 
fact, linked to something - that when one thought, one 
always had something as an end point to the act of 
thinking. ‘Thinking’ is always ‘thinking something’. 
This fundamental and basic premise, called 
‘intentionality’, meant that, in fact, the very act of 
thinking is an act that affirms the union that exists 
between the thinking subject and the object of 
thinking. As Merleau-Ponty says, paraphrasing Kant 
(1974, p. 201), “We can only think the world because 
we have already experienced it.” 
There is, in this view of human knowing, an 
assumption that since we are permanently in the life 
world, we have always somehow a sense of being 
engaged in the world. The expression, ‘life world’ 
used in phenomenological writings, is defined by 
Schutz (1975, p. 15) as: 
… the whole sphere of everyday experiences, 
orientations, and actions through which 
individuals pursue their interests and affairs 
by manipulating objects, dealing with people, 
conceiving plans and carrying them out. 
Valle and Halling (1989, p. 9) refer to the life world 
as: 
… the world as lived by the person and not 
the hypothetical external entity separate from 
or independent from him or her. 
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This idea of life world refers to the actual experienced 
world of a person corresponding to that person’s 
intentional awareness.  
In the act of knowing where language is used (and it 
is suggested there are certain kinds of knowings 
which do not use language), there is a presumption 
that everything which is known has some objective 
existence and that, at the same time, in the act of 
knowing, has been subjected to a hermeneutic through 
which it is named. In other words, the act of naming 
stands between the knower and the ‘things 
themselves’. It is never possible to use the kind of 
thinking and knowing which is linked to language to 
get behind language to a direct intuiting of the world 
outside the mind.  
The phenomenological perspective then goes on to 
suggest that abstract knowledge and forms of 
positivist scientific knowledge create a cleavage when 
people begin to imagine themselves as one thing and 
the world as another, rather than the whole world with 
people in it being the life world which is the only 
experienced reality people really possess. It is this 
experienced reality that phenomenological research 
wants to uncover and attend to. That desire to attend 
to the life world - the experienced world - requires 
knowledge which, as Heidegger (1982, p. 276) points 
out, is “not cognition in the mere spectator sense.” It 
also requires appropriate language which is not built 
upon the separation between the world and the 
knowing person, but rather a language of attention 
and contemplation which allows the world to be.  
Since all articulated human knowing is locked in 
language, the project to attend upon ‘the things 
themselves’ cannot expect to find a way of knowing 
that goes completely behind language. As was pointed 
out in the introduction, it is rather in the way human 
knowers position themselves towards the world that 
may at least contribute to a way of knowing that 
minimises the amount of what might be called 
‘secondary processing’ occurring in and around the 
acts of knowing and naming the world. This 
introduces the notions of stances and modes of 
knowing.   
Knowing stances: proactive and reactive 
Crotty (1996a, p. 38) speaks of the active role of 
consciousness:  
... the mind reaches out to the object and into 
the object and draws it into itself, at once 
shaping the object and being shaped by it.  
Allowing that consciousness has necessarily an active 
role in every act of knowing, it is useful to make a 
second distinction between active/reductive and 
intuitive/receptive forms of thinking. Thinking, the 
act of engaging in thought, does not always carry an 
active connotation in its use although, of course, in 
many cases it is imagined as a strongly active, almost 
transitive, process. One thinks when one ‘puts one’s 
mind to something’; when one ‘gets a grip on’ an 
idea; when one analyses, categorizes, generalizes, 
discriminates between things, or groups of things. The 
mind when engaged in these proactive pursuits, can 
be imagined as a kind of sheepdog grouping ideas, 
separating, challenging.  
There are, however, other times when the mind is 
‘struck by’, ‘seized by’, ‘gripped by’ something 
known. At these times, the mind seems more like a 
receptor, receiving ideas and images and feeling and 
being moved by them. 
Thus, the more one reflects upon one’s thinking, the 
more one is confronted with a proactive and a 
contemplative modality. The proactive way is 
imagined to be a series of processes variously 
interpreted, in which a thinker moves from taking in 
and naming experiences in some fashion, to ordering 
them and locating them into the more generalized 
categories of one’s language and ways of seeing the 
world.  
The intuitive/contemplative way refers to more 
receptive and aesthetic forms of thinking and focusing 
attention. The thinking human positions him or 
herself vis à vis an object with a receptive stance and 
holds back discriminatory analytic thinking in favour 
of a more contemplative process. In this form of 
thinking the object of thought is less robustly dealt 
with. The mind does not ‘seize upon’ the object to 
analyse and subdue it but attempts to behold it, to 
allow its reality, its beauty and its texture to become 
more and more present. Even here consciousness is 
still active, but the act of thinking is different: it is an 
act of reception which holds the thinking mind back 
from closure and returns again and again to behold 
the object, allowing words and images to emerge 
from the contemplative engagement.  
Heron (1992, p. 14) suggested that human 
consciousness could be viewed as being in four 
modes - affective, imaginal, conceptual and praxis - 
each, as it were, placed on top of the next in what he 
called an “up-hierarchy”, so that the lower one 
energized the one above it. In the imaginal mode, 
which is similar to the receptive, contemplative stance 
mentioned here, the psyche turns presences brought 
inchoately into consciousness through experience, 
into images “through the creative role of primary 
imagination in perceiving the world as a whole.” 
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Heron says that this mode is evoked in knowing 
actions such as “intuitive grasp” or “metaphorical 
insight.” 
While stressing its intuitive, receptive modality, it is 
important not to over-emphasize the receptive nature 
of this kind of direct knowing. The human knower 
does not open the shutters of the mind and an image 
of some object or experience does not physically 
imprint itself on the psyche. All kinds of knowing 
require work by the knower. Ihde (1973, p. 67), in his 
interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s work, refers to “a 
world which is always pregnant with significance, but 
whose meaning must be re-won through an 
interrogation of its presence.”   
Forms of interpretation  
The outcomes of phenomenological reflection, like 
that of any other inquiry, are thoughts, discourses and 
written texts. As such, the person engaged in 
phenomenological reflection is trying to engage with 
the lived-experience, which, as has been pointed out 
above, is in fact a processed experience. The person 
has engaged with the things in the world in so far as 
they are phenomena, that is, in so far as they are 
presented to consciousness. As we have seen, the 
‘thing itself’ is not presented to consciousness. What 
is presented is only a named and therefore somewhat 
‘experienced thing’. Such an experienced thing is 
named from within the lexicon of the experiencing 
person.  
The acts of naming and saying things about the 
phenomenon, even while consciously ‘bracketing out’ 
culturally generated abstracting interpretations, are 
still forms of interpretative action. There is still some 
kind of hermeneutic or interpretative template at 
work. For example, when a child learns the name of 
an object - the thing to which it has been pointing or 
touching and which it knows in an inchoate way - in 
that moment, it is known as named. Merleau-Ponty 
(1962, p. 177) writes:  
… for the child the thing is not known until it 
is named, the name is the essence of the thing 
and resides in it on the same footing as its 
colour and its form. 
But of course before the thing was named, it had 
some kind of existence in consciousness, which was 
evoked in the process of giving it its name. That 
existence was itself already a kind of interpreted 
existence through the way the thing-to-be-named was 
already used and referred to in the exchanges of the 
life world. Heidegger refers to this exchange as 
“primordial interpretation”, which, as Cooper (1996, 
p. 428) writes: 
… is carried out “not in a theoretical 
statement but in an action” (Heidegger 
1980, 200), as when one “interprets 
something as a hammer by using it as 
such”... In basic interpretation, we do not 
throw a “signification” over some naked 
thing (ibid: 190) for nothing is 
encountered in the raw but always as a 
door, house or whatever. Heidegger 
accordingly describes Dasein’s [being in 
the world] relation to its world as 
“hermeneutic”, a term designating the 
business of interpreting. Moreover, since 
phenomenology, whose aim is the 
“disclosedness of Being”, can only 
proceed by uncovering Dasein’s own 
implicit understanding, it follows that 
phenomenology itself is hermeneutics 
(ibid. pp. 61ff.). 
The challenge is to think (and write) focused 
consciously on the phenomenon. When speech, 
language and thought patterns generated from 
experience in the world are used, they always involve 
an interpretative process: but the aim here is to try to 
disclose the most naive and basic interpretation that is 
already there but as yet is unelaborated in the life 
world experience, a phenomenological hermeneutic.  
The hermeneutic process refers to the way people 
interpret and make sense of experiences, usually by 
naming them according to their pre-existing values 
and ways of seeing the world.  The question is, can 
we develop an, as it were, pre-interpretative 
hermeneutic by which we hold the phenomenon in 
our gaze and drink it in, waiting for it almost to name 
itself in our consciousness while resisting the 
temptation to locate it on conceptual grids and grand 
theories. Admitting that this process is still an 
interpretation, after Reason (1981, p. 79) it can be 
called an ‘expressive’ or ‘immediate’ interpretation so 
that more elaborated interpretations can be referred to 
as explanatory interpretative processes. The important 
construction of abstracting interpretations within, or 
consequent to, an experience can then be grounded in 
reality and enriched by building on the intuitive, 
expressive ‘reading’ or ‘interpretation’ of the 
experience. This is the phenomenological project by 
which the meanings things have in our life world 
experience are brought into view. 
This initial hermeneutic still calls upon one’s store of 
language, and values generated from our ways of 
being in our culture. The difference will be in our 
stance, which will be consciously trying to avoid 
analytic or generalizing language, and letting the 
phenomenon declare itself. As van Manen (1987, p. 
19) says: 
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The aim is to construct an animating, 
evocative description (text) of human actions, 
behaviours, intentions and experiences as we 
meet them in the life world. 
Given that the life world is what is there all the time - 
the lived world as it is experienced - the 
consciousness generated by this phenomenological 
exploration - contemplation - does not create new 
knowledge of the phenomenon; it creates a space in 
which phenomena manifest themselves. Merleau-
Ponty’s speaks about “perception” (his word for the 
unmediated awareness of the life world) “not giving 
truth like geometry, but presences” (1974, p. 198). 
“Presences” refers to a kind of unveiling of something 
that was there all the time but not explicitly present in 
consciousness. Stanage (1987) has coined the phrase 
“consciousing” to refer to that permanent, implicit 
awareness of being in the life world of which one is a 
part:  
… it means knowing-together, or knowing in 
such intimate, and logically primitive, form 
that all knowing and all cognitive activities or 
persons are constituted partly through it 
(Stanage 1987, p. 327). 
Related to questions concerning perceptual and 
conceptualizing knowing, and to their related modes 
of knowing, is the question of the subjectivity and/or 
objectivity of such knowing experiences, particularly 
when pursued under a research rubric when they are 
represented in language and various verbal and 
textual forms.  
Objectivity and subjectivity 
Research requiring ‘objectivity’, which is probably 
still the dominant public discourse surrounding ideas 
of research, has become associated with the positivist 
approach to research. Alternative approaches have 
sought to admit forms of human subjectivity into 
academic writing and to portray the personal as 
political and socially relevant. Neither of these 
positions has quite met the phenomenological project 
with its interest in, and focus on, ‘the experience’ that 
human subjects have, rather than the human subjects 
having the experience. The phenomenological 
question was to find a way to name and portray 
human experience which would be both somewhat 
subjective and at the same time somewhat objective. 
To meet this challenge, I have coined the phrases 
‘subjectivised subjective’ experience on the one hand 
and ‘objectivised subjective’ experience on the other 
which both seem similar to Spiegelberg’s ‘subject 
dependent’ and ‘subject related’ categories. 
The phenomenological project seeks what can be 
called objectivising subjectivity - focusing on the 
thing being experienced but still as experienced by me 
- as apart from subjectivising subjectivity. Human 
language carries this distinction easily when a person 
is asked what something was like (for example, a 
childhood visit to the dentist). The person might say: 
‘It was terrifying. I felt as if my heart would break, 
my palms were sweating, and I wondered if I would 
ever get out of it.’ The listener might interrupt saying, 
‘I can understand what you felt like, but can you tell 
me what it was like?’ The speaker might then talk 
about the shiny instruments, the white coat, the 
strange smells and sounds; the cold or the heat, the 
contoured chair, being recumbent; the pink hands of 
the surgeon and the grinding noise of the drill. 
The phenomenological project seems to be enriched 
by integrating both emphases. There is a sense that 
the objectivities that are highlighted in an experience 
are those which generated a strong subjective 
response. In a way, elements of an experience that do 
not impact upon the awareness of the person narrating 
it may not, in fact, be part of the phenomenon. The 
definition of a phenomenon - ‘what manifests itself in 
experience’ - suggests this, although in the process of 
reflection a person may become aware of many 
dimensions of an experience that were, in fact, 
manifested but somewhat not attuned to, or at least 
not foregrounded in, awareness. 
Variations 
The distinction between these forms of subjectivity 
has had considerable ramifications in approaches to 
phenomenological research. Crotty’s research (1996a) 
into phenomenological approaches in nursing 
research was to point out what he called “new” and 
what is called here  ‘empathetic phenomenology’ in 
contrast to classical phenomenology, and to show 
how whole traditions of research have been built on 
different construals of this approach. 
The explorations of phenomenology to this point in 
this paper have largely been brief outlines of the 
classical approach beginning with Husserl. According 
to Crotty’s exposition, the alternative approach does 
not focus so much on the phenomenon as it becomes 
visible, but on the subjective experiences and 
meanings that are generated in or are generated by its 
beholders.  
This “new” phenomenology focuses on the meanings 
and significances given to an experience by those 
experiencing it. Crotty writes that (1996, p. 3): 
The new phenomenology works hard at 
gathering people’s subjective meanings, the 
sense they make of things (“What does 
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giving post-mortem nursing care mean to 
those nurses?”). 
Such knowledge is of great interest in many 
explorations of social science. It shows that different 
people participating in an event in their lives may 
give it radically different meanings. Thus a patient 
and a health professional, an adult educator and an 
adult learner, may engage in a shared activity but 
have quite radically different experiences of it. It is 
then possible to inquire about the nature of the 
experience and how it presented itself as a 
phenomenon as in classical phenomenology or to 
follow the alternative empathetic phenomenology by 
inquiring what the subject made of that experience: 
what was its significance. This latter pursuit with 
interviews, thematic analysis and clustering of 
interview transcripts looking for the common 
meanings an experience had for a group of subjects, 
represents a major way of working in qualitative 
social science research. Its contribution is that it 
brings to view the subjective states and interpretations 
of people who have engaged in a common experience 
like school, university, hospital, church and the like, 
and which may have been overlooked or repressed by 
powerful interests in society. The focus is on the 
subject; it protects and values the contributions of 
various subjects engaged in life experiences.  
The interpretative or empathetic approach to 
phenomenological research has made a contribution 
by showing the socially embedded nature of human 
consciousness. It may not have advanced the cause of 
classical phenomenology, but it has defended and 
made known what groups of people - teachers, nurses, 
soldiers - have felt when involved in a shared 
experience, and what sense they made of it. The 
experience is then named in terms of the subjectivity 
it evokes in those who experienced it. 
There is, however, a price to be paid for attending to 
the meanings something has for a subject. If the 
research focus remains exclusively with the subject it 
is easy to imagine that the structure of the experience 
itself may tend to become shadowy, and to be 
drowned in the subject’s self-awareness, self pre-
occupation and self-talk.  That is why, in the adult 
education study I pursued, while welcoming and 
wanting to find a place for some subjectivity 
(particularly since phenomena in human awareness 
always have elements of subjectivity), I was 
concerned to move back to the phenomenon - to the 
lived-experience - which generated the subjective 
feelings and meanings. I wanted to bracket out my 
feelings and thoughts for a moment and let the 
experiences I was recalling present themselves for 
contemplation.  
Having looked at the two complementary versions of 
phenomenological research, the study considers three 
major processes used in the quest for ‘the things 
themselves’.          
The processes of phenomenological inquiry 
Phenomenology when pursued in research projects 
tends to use three essential processes in a variety of 
ways and styles: description, reduction and naming 
essential themes.  
Description 
Description is the essential task for classical 
phenomenology. Seamus Heaney, the poet (1990, p. 
89), referred to description as “revelation”, which 
literally means removing veils which obscure or 
disguise the realities of the world. It is significant that 
in some contexts social scientists were warned to 
avoid ‘mere’ description.  There is, of course, nothing 
‘mere’ in generating phenomenological description: 
attempting to get back to ‘the things themselves’ and 
to set aside preconceptions and tendencies to analyse 
or generalize, and rather attempt to contemplate the 
thing itself.  As Crotty (1996a, p. 280) puts it:  
The difficulty does not lie merely in seeing 
“what lies before our eyes” (which Husserl 
saw as a “hard demand”), or knowing 
“precisely what we see” (Merleau-Ponty said 
there was nothing more difficult to know than 
that). Additionally, we will also experience 
great difficulty in actually describing what 
we have succeeded in seeing and knowing. 
When we attempt to describe what we have 
never had to describe before, language fails 
us. We find our descriptions incoherent, 
fragmentary, and not a little “mysterious”. 
We find ourselves lost for words, forced to 
invent words and bend existing words to bear 
the meanings we need them to carry for us. 
This has always been characteristic of 
phenomenological description. We may have 
to be quite inventive and creative in this 
respect. 
This significant quotation succinctly points to the 
project of classical phenomenological writing and its 
challenges to build adequate, or perhaps better, less 
inadequate texts. It points to the challenge of 
inventiveness, of ways to ‘get past oneself’. The 
project has a kind of infinite end-point in that it can 
never be absolutely achieved; that there will always 
be some kind of hermeneutic - some kind of 
processing - involved in the choice of intuitive words 
and language in the very act of rejecting intermediate 
interpretative processes. The significant thing in the 
argument of phenomenology is that to take steps to 
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bracket everyday understandings, even when the task 
can never be perfectly achieved, is to perform a 
service to human science by going back attentively 
and receptively to the experience itself - to the 
phenomenon. 
One of the ways phenomenological description can be 
attempted is by using various texts from various 
perspectives to generate a “layered picture” of a 
phenomenon rather like a series of transparencies 
overlaid on an overhead projector. These are then 
explored for common elements that recur not in the 
idea of the thing but in its experience narrated from 
different points of view. This process creates a multi-
perspective text. I attempted this in my thesis (cf., 
Willis, 1998).  
Valle and Halling (1989, p. 13) support this view. 
They suggest that: 
Phenomena as they present to us, seem to 
reveal themselves in many different ways 
depending on how we look at them or “take 
them up” in our many, varied perspectives 
and life situations… The perceived 
phenomenon is analogous to a mineral 
crystal that appears to have many different 
sizes and shapes depending on the intensity, 
angle and colour of the light that strikes its 
surface. Only after seeing these different 
reflections and varied appearances on 
repeated occasions does the constant, 
unchanging crystalline structure become 
known to us.  
Of course there is a presumption here that phenomena 
have a “constant unchanging structure”, whereas it 
seems that some phenomena, like adult education 
practice or religion, do not seem to have a strictly 
univocal structure, but appear to be more of a 
grouping of characteristics under a common name 
held together by what Wittgenstein called (1953) a 
“family resemblance.” What is suggested, however, is 
that even gaining insight into elements that mostly, 
but not always, occur in a phenomenon, can 
contribute considerable illumination.  
Bracketing 
‘Bracketing’ refers to the process of standing apart 
from one’s usual ways of conceiving the world and 
the things in it, and attempting to intuit ‘the thing’, the 
object of interest, the phenomenon, directly in an 
unmediated way. Van Manen (1990, p. 175) defines it 
as “suspending one’s various beliefs in the reality of 
the natural world in order to study the essential 
structures of the world.” 
The term “essential structures” of the world has a 
hard and substantifying feel to it, as if ‘the world’ was 
understood as something ‘out there’, whose structures 
- another term implying reification - could somehow 
be discovered. This is not van Manen’s intention at 
all. The ‘world’ in this phenomenological discourse is 
the ‘experienced life world’, understood as a fluid 
overlaying of which the person finds her or himself as 
a part of all the familiar and recurrent experiences of 
body, time, space and social relations which make up 
a person’s felt world. The ‘structures’ of such a 
‘world’ refer more to recurrent central themes within 
the experience: ‘what’ makes the experience what it 
is, and the ‘world’ in this sense ‘what’ it is. The 
concept of themes or essences is explored further 
below. To turn one’s mind back to these experiences 
in their raw unclassified or unanalysed state requires 
developing a way to bypass rather than extinguish the 
ordinary, habitual ways people develop to interpret 
and name their world. This is the function of 
bracketing. 
Husserl (1973, p. 53) suggested that there is, in 
ordinary consciousness, a pre-existent bracketing (or 
what he calls universal “epoché”), which shuts out the 
unmediated perception of the world and replaces it 
with overlays of perception, judgment and the like: 
The universal epoché of the world as it 
becomes conscious (the “putting it in 
brackets”) has the effect of shutting out from 
the phenomenological field the world as it 
simply exists; its place however is taken by 
the world as it is given in consciousness 
(perceived, remembered, judged, thought, 
valued etc.). 
Husserl then suggested that people have to take on a 
transcendent attitude to avoid being imprisoned by 
one’s everyday awareness and judgments of the 
world. He suggested that people should make their 
pre-judgments explicit so that they could be laid 
aside.  
Heron (1996, p. 120) explains that a person seeking to 
pursue the phenomenological task needs to:  
… bring these implicit everyday epistemic 
frameworks into clear relief and become fully 
aware of them. Then we can become 
relatively independent of them, peer over the 
edge of them and regenerate our vision. 
The research of Heron and his colleague has been 
enriched by their explorations of psychotherapy and 
forms of human transpersonal and spiritual activity. 
Their writings have no difficulty with this notion of 
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‘peering over the edge of one’s everyday epistemic 
frameworks.’ It bears the stamp of practice - on which 
this paper is also based, and moreover it is common 
enough in the experience of people attempting to 
learn or re-frame their way of seeing the world by 
developing skills in ‘standing apart from’ or ‘aside 
from’ their habitual ideas, feelings, convictions, etc., 
so as not to allow them to cloud the whole of their 
awareness. Heron (ibid. p. 122) cites Reason (1994a, 
p. 34), who puts it thus: 
Behind the attachment of the everyday mind 
to its constricting perspectives, there is a 
“mind which is able to see through this 
attachment and is open to the ways in which 
we create ourselves and our world moment 
to moment” and which is available through 
meditation.  
Bracketing can thus be seen as an implied activity 
when researchers want to focus their eyes on a 
phenomenon in itself, and resist taking on alternative 
analytic or generalizing agendas. As such, the process 
amounts to nothing more than attempting to focus on 
the phenomenon and allowing it as it were, to 'declare 
itself'.   
The third process in the applications of 
phenomenology to human science research - naming 
essential themes or thematic analysis - must now be 
considered. 
Naming essential themes 
Phenomenological research brings the mind to a 
phenomenon as it presents itself through different 
windows of experience and at different times. 
Phenomenology wants to discover the essential 
elements of a particular phenomenon. In other words, 
as Spiegelberg (1975, p. 64) wrote, to seek “what is 
essential and what is merely accidental or contingent” 
in the phenomenon. Valle and Halling (1989, p. 13) 
put it this way: 
Regardless of which of the phenomenon’s 
particular variations is revealed at any given 
time, this phenomenon is seen as having the 
same essential meaning when it is perceived 
over time in many different situations. 
Thematic analysis is known frequently to suffer from 
the difficulty of being mistaken for a conceptual 
rather than phenomenological exercise. When one 
looks for phenomenological themes one’s eyes are 
held on the phenomenon as it is experienced in a 
range of settings and episodes, looking for recurrent 
themes in its lived-experience. The act of separating 
accidental elements from necessary or substantial 
ones in a recurrent experience is very different from 
looking for accidental or contingent elements, in 
contrast to substantial or necessary elements in an 
idea, which is characteristic of forms of conceptual 
analysis. The reducing or distilling process, applied as 
it is to such different entities, ends up quite different 
in its notion and its practice. In practice, searching for 
themes in phenomenological research means to resist 
the tendency to leave the phenomenon behind in the 
reducing process. Van Manen has made some strong 
points here about the drawing out of themes and 
phenomenology needing to keep its attentive and 
contemplative stance. He writes (1990, p. 88) that 
theme analysis is the process of insightful invention, 
discovery and disclosure: 
As I arrive at certain thematic insights, it may 
seem that insight is a product of all of these; 
invention (interpretative product), discovery 
(the interpretative product of my dialogue 
with the text of life) and disclosure of 
meaning (the interpretative product ‘given’ to 
me by the text of life itself). 
These quotations highlight the importance of ensuring 
that this process, subsequent to description, keeps 
with the phenomenon - the lived-experience. It needs 
to tread a middle way between two extremes. One is 
succumbing to too much subjectivity, where themes 
would end up being linked to a person’s recurring 
feelings and not elements of the experience itself. The 
other is being caught up in too much analysis, by 
which the experience would be located in an 
explanatory category and the characteristics of the 
category imputed to it. 
There is a holographic perspective in searching for 
phenomenological themes in that the whole of the 
experience is represented in each theme, which 
presents more like different windows on the whole 
experience.  This correlates with Valle and Halling’s 
(1989) notion of the phenomenon as crystalline 
(quoted above), with many facets each presenting the 
whole. The structures of experiences, by which they 
are accorded some commonality, are the recurring 
elements that are most meaningful to us. Thematic 
analysis is a way of uncovering those elements that 
constitute the phenomenon as experienced. 
The interpretation followed here departs from a strict 
Husserlian view which tends to presume that there are 
'essences' in phenomena which phenomenology seeks 
to disclose. The view here is that focused attention to 
the felt lineaments of an experience whether imagined 
to have essences or not, is still a useful way to attend 
upon and attempt careful description of lived- 
experiences. Unfortunately, these can still suffer from 
a lack of such attention under the influence of 
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analyzing and categorizing approaches of so much 
social science inquiry.  
And so the quest for ‘the things themselves’ 
is thus revealed as nothing quite so absolute. 
In allowing for the essentially constructivist, 
interpretative view of human consciousness, 
the quest is however revealed to have two 
concerns. The first is to cultivate an active 
suspicion of assumptions and prejudices that 
might tacitly influence and subvert honest 
inquiry. The second, which has been the 
theme of our recent project (cf., Willis, 
Smith, & Collins 2000) is the importance of 
understanding and developing expressive 
approaches to rigorous inquiry which can 
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